Shingwaukonse: A Nineteenth-Century Innovative Ojibwa Leader

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Abstract. Information derived from an ethnohistorical analysis of Shingwaukonse's leadership career is used to assess a prevailing ethnographic contention that self-interested action characterized leadership among the Ojibwa by the mid-nineteenth century. It is argued that while the above position may be appropriate with regard to southwestern Ojibwa groups defiantly resisting white western expansionism, leaders in the northeastern sector of the Upper Great Lakes were seeking creative ways in which to assist bands in preserving the spirit of reciprocity traditionally characterizing relations between leader and group. Recent anthropological studies have demonstrated that the Ojibwa view of power relationships differs substantively from western conceptions of competitive self-interest, a finding that provides a convenient point of departure for a historical investigation not only of Shingwaukonse's career but also of certain important political, social, and economic developments that arose as a legacy of this chief's ideas and actions.

The speeches of Shingwaukonse, or Little Pine (1773–1853), an Ojibwa leader who resided at Garden River, east of Sault Ste. Marie, Canada West, furnished some of the most explicit testimonials to the principle of aboriginal right to be expressed during the mid-nineteenth century. Shingwaukonse's ideas and actions set precedents that exerted a profound influence on the future course of Canadian Indian policy. By 1850 this chief had defined three major goals for native people: first, to establish linkages with government agencies just beginning to exercise jurisdiction in the Upper Great Lakes area; second, to preserve an environment in which Ojibwa cultural values and organizational structures could survive; and finally, to devise new strategies conducive to the formation of band governments capable of assuming a degree of proprietorship over resources...
on aboriginal lands. All of these goals required that a chief be forceful and insightful. But could a nineteenth-century aboriginal leader evince principled ideas and behavior worthy of standing the test of time? Evidence from both oral and documentary sources indicates that Shingwaukonse’s career left a lasting legacy, yet prevailing ethnohistorical models provide few avenues to investigate such innovative decision making in a constructive way. Until recently, anthropologists and historians have focused on Ojibwa decision making almost exclusively within the context of a hunting, trapping, and fishing way of life, to the neglect of Ojibwa leaders’ other traditional prerogatives. For this reason, this essay begins by examining nonnative and native views on Ojibwa leadership, as well as the internal colonialism model, a prominent theoretical construct that has had a considerable bearing on recent ethnohistorical perspectives.

Next, the essay discusses why, as Ojibwa groups progressively became encapsulated within developing nation-states on both sides of the international border, traditional conceptions of leadership survived. Traditional leaders certainly had formidable challenges to face during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Many of these individuals—among them Gitche Besheke, or Great Buffalo, from near Lapointe, Wisconsin, and Eshkebegocooshe, or Flat Mouth, from Leech Lake in Minnesota—joined a resistance movement whose momentum was fed by the dualistic ideology promulgated by Tenskwatawa, the Shawnee Prophet, who portrayed whites as evil serpents to be forced back into the sea. Discouraged by the Prophet’s failure to achieve his goals, these leaders afterward reemphasized attachment to conservative social and religious practices. Yet new stresses and strains made conformity to such social ideals difficult. In the resulting confusion certain chiefs, among them the Minnesotan leader Hole in the Day the Younger, a man whose career has been traced in some detail by James G. E. Smith, grew increasingly self-promotional in ways that dismayed their native followers. It is argued, however, that while self-interest may have colored the actions of certain southwestern Ojibwa chiefs, Shingwaukonse and his allies north of the Upper Great Lakes were not so motivated. This fact led many southwestern Ojibwa bands to rally to their cause, as well as young Métis individuals, who, barred from fur trade occupations by company retrenchment, similarly felt threatened by a bleak economic and social future. Shingwaukonse promised both an alternative, and they hearkened to his vision, in which aboriginal values and western technology and expertise might be combined to furnish native people a secure place in the rising Canadian nation.
Nonnative and Native Conceptions of Ojibwa Leadership

Ojibwa chiefs confronted formidable challenges in having their views listened to respectfully by government officialdom. Certain nonnative nineteenth-century perspectives held that Ojibwa traditional beliefs precluded rational thought, and frontier resource developers, and others who found it expedient to contrast native interests with the public good, often championed such views. Their charge that aboriginal individuals acted in disorganized, wasteful ways facilitated the rise and implementation of national policies severely limiting native peoples’ control over resources even on aboriginal lands. Yet not all individuals expounding such views had conscious ulterior motives for entertaining them. Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, often lauded as the father of American ethnography, characterized Ojibwa beliefs as entities that constrained a person’s thought to an emotional perception of the universe, “feeling almost everything, hoping almost nothing.”

Schoolcraft, who was Indian agent at Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, from 1822 to 1841, firmly adhered to a belief in individual as well as collective progress, to be attained through the refinement of what he termed the “manly independent spirit.” Such an ideology stressed personal initiative, tough-minded decision making, and systematic reflection as the only elements conducive to true leadership—a narrow perspective that militated against fine-grained analyses of Ojibwa traditional thought and action.

Early-twentieth-century comparisons drawn between western and Ojibwa concepts of personal initiative tended to cast the native thought system in an unfavorable light. Recent anthropological studies, by contrast, demonstrate that Algonquian societies impose checks and balances on leaders displaying disruptive self-interested behavior and that bands favor passive defiance over sudden violent resistance when principled paths of action are not immediately apparent. Mary Black-Rogers, in an article titled “Ojibwa Power Belief System,” argues that the Ojibwa stress the idea of responsibility far more than authoritative action. Cultural beliefs concerning power, control, and responsibility restrain leaders “from forcing a definition of the situation” to avoid impinging on the autonomy of others. The range of a leader’s prerogatives varies as a function of the self-sufficiency and productivity not of himself alone but of his unit as a whole. While a power holder’s decision-making talents, seen as “gifts” derived from spiritual agencies, remain covertly expressed except in certain ritualized settings, demonstration of their working to the benefit of the group assures others of the consistency with which power is used to further band welfare.
Prominent individuals also are considered able to shift identities with alacrity, a trait that, until recently, scholars seem to have overlooked. A recognized power holder could assume, abandon, or shift roles. There has been a lack of appreciation for the diversity and complexity of leadership roles within Ojibwa society. From information gathered by the author in the 1980s from elders at Garden River, Ontario, it nevertheless became apparent that the mishinaway (data collector), the kekedowenine (mediator and conflict resolver), and the oskabewis (speaker and messenger) were almost as important to group decision making as the ogima (head chief) and the anikeogima (second or subchief).9 On assuming the role of mishinaway, a person had to abide closely by group directives, since both Schoolcraft and Schoolcraft's superior in the United States Indian Affairs Department, Thomas L. McKenney, also described the mishinaway as an economical aid responsible for the distribution of presents and other goods.10 While power holders might move among roles, wisdom often lay in knowing what role to play at what time.

At no time in history, however, could the head chief be considered either a centralizing agent or a distributor of material wealth. The ogima's principal duty was to establish and sustain political linkages with other powerful agencies, which would secure a stable milieu for his group. To this end an elaborate system of ceremonial exchange developed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries within the native community. Influential leaders, endowed with knowledge of native medicine and political control, sought to uphold a balance of power among bands residing in the Upper Great Lakes area while maintaining workable and generally harmonious interaction with the French, and later British and American, authorities.

The Internal Colonialism Model

According to this model, indigenous peoples became encapsulated within state societies in ways that both fragmented and disempowered their populations. As applied to the Ojibwa context,11 this construct contends that a rapid and drastic shift in the political order of the Upper Great Lakes district following the close of the War of 1812 divested aboriginal leadership of powers it had previously exercised during the earlier colonial era. In his seminal work The Middle Ground, Richard White argues that native-white interaction in the Great Lakes region engendered novel cultural accommodations in the Great Lakes region only until 1815.12 After this date traditional leaders could muster neither the economic nor political wherewithal to make their groups' demands heard.
This reversal was especially hard on the Ojibwa population, since, as late as the 1790s, British and Ojibwa interests had tended to complement one another. John Graves Simcoe, the governor of Upper Canada, had argued for the maintenance by Britain of an Indian buffer zone in the Ohio region,\textsuperscript{13} and he had received backing for his plan, which was intended both to assist British trade and to counter threats of French and Spanish incursions from the south, from the Mohawk chief, Joseph Brant. In turn Brant, in conjunction with the Shawnee leader Tecumseh, attempted to convince the Ojibwa, Shawnee, Ottawa, and Miami to resist further land sales in the western district.\textsuperscript{14} This confederacy proved short-lived, however, since General Anthony Wayne’s decisive victory over the Shawnees and their allies at Fallen Timbers in 1794, and the signing of the Treaty of Greenville the following year, deprived league members of much of their land in the Ohio Valley region. Distrust brewed of Britain, which, despite promises, had failed to come to the aid of the western nations in their hour of need. Many Ojibwas, including Gitche Besheke and Eshkebugecooshe, became drawn into the militant activities of more southerly native nations, for without the support of British power, unification promised strength as the cutting edge of American settlement and resource exploration pressed northwest.\textsuperscript{15} But the British fur trade’s decline occasioned widespread political, economic, and social disruption. Trading chiefs disappeared, since their role had related exclusively to the narrow trade sphere. Since peltry had translated into power in the negotiating forum, lack of fur in the Upper Great Lakes area meant reduced opportunities for connecting with commercial interests, and through them, with government officialdom. Gradually aboriginal leaders had to accept the consequences of governmental ultimatums made far beyond their control, since, in losing most of their former powers, they had acquired few new ones.\textsuperscript{16}

To quell American fears of potential native unrest along the Canadian-American boundary, the British War Office shunned its former aboriginal military and trade allies. Bands were induced to join experimental government-sponsored farming communities, isolated from metropolitan centers, fur trade posts, and the international border. Not surprisingly, Ojibwa leaders complained they felt like specimens under scrutiny, fearful that they and their people might be relegated to being hewers of wood and drawers of water.\textsuperscript{17} As time progressed, native leadership became increasingly shackled by externally devised and implemented economic, political, and legal constraints. Nineteenth-century United States Indian policy especially earmarked trade as one means by which Ojibwa political as well as economic loyalties could be manipulated after the close of
And it has been held that the economically marginalized Ojibwa chiefs encountered fewer and fewer opportunities for policy making other than in monitoring the distribution of government assistance money granted to their communities to ward off hardship. Yet while American military commanders residing on the western frontier may have promoted this view, it appears from a close analysis of the historical record that bands actually continued to act fairly consistently in keeping with their own interests—especially with regard to preserving a milieu in which their culture could survive and develop, far more than in response to commercial determinants. And as it may be posited that self-interest is not an inherent trait of Ojibwa culture, as Black-Rogers and other anthropologists have shown, competition over control of these limited funds—responsible for promoting political factionalism on some reserves—must be considered abnormal and stress induced.

To bolster this argument, it certainly may be shown that Ojibwa culture historically had exhibited amazing resilience in the face of change. For one thing, the fur trade had given rise to new leadership roles. For another, the Ojibwa’s negotiating practices, deriving from indigenous roots, had grown increasingly sophisticated over time. Social scientists who adopt the internal colonialism model therefore find that they need to move beyond the use of generative exchange theories, which focus principally on modes of attaining and retaining power, to include research into historical settings and social and cultural factors that have affected Ojibwa decision making. From this revised perspective, cherished Ojibwa values and beliefs must be viewed as having a bearing on native leaders’ own developing conceptions of what constituted aboriginal right within the context of the Canadian nation-state.

Shingwaukonse’s Early Leadership Career

Social and political changes were paramount facts of Shingwaukonse’s life. Born in 1773 on Grand Island, Michigan, Little Pine assumed many roles before becoming a head chief in 1836, at sixty-three years of age. As a trading chief he guided brigades to the Red River and the headwaters of the Mississippi. He gained notoriety fighting against the Dakota, opposed the Shawnee Prophet’s resistance campaign despite many other chiefs’ involvement in it, and by 1809 had become an oskabewis, or spokesperson. His attachment to John Askin Jr., the Métis son of a prominent British merchant at Mackinac and Detroit, strengthened his resolve to uphold the British interest during the War of 1812. He fought on the British side in many engagements, including campaigns at Detroit, Queenston Heights,
Shingwaukonse and Moraviantown. In the role of a kekedowenine he resolved a dispute between an official party of United States military personnel and a local Sault subchief at a treaty-making ceremony in 1820. Although Shingwaukonse remained aloof from American treaty negotiations, his timely intervention in 1820 brought him to the attention of Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, who from then on became a principal recorder of his activities and accomplishments.

According to Schoolcraft, Shingwaukonse traced "his lineage from the old Crane band" at Sault Ste. Marie whose members regarded an eighteenth-century figure, Gitcheokanojeeed, or Great Crane, as their common ancestor. Shingwaukonse, however, did not possess the Crane totem, the bird symbol employed by most of the other Sault leaders as a designating mark in council forums. A totem was both a personal and a group identifier, transferred between generations in the male line. Linked to the local band through his mother and having either a French or French Métis father, Shingwaukonse initially lacked a totem. A celebrated war leader, orator, member of the Midewiwin and Wabano medicine societies, and a dijiki, or shaking tent conjuror, Little Pine nevertheless elicited respect from native and nonnative alike. He was a leading member of the Midewiwin, or Grand Medicine Society, where traditional power holders congregated for several days to perform rites that stressed revitalization both on the personal and community level, and undoubtedly his reputation as a noted medicine practitioner enhanced his political stature. He had formally declared his autonomy from the United States in the spring of 1836, but it was not until later the same year, following the death of a Crane leader, Kaygayosh, who had been Shingwaukonse's mentor in the Midewiwin, that Shingwaukonse assumed the rank of a head chief, with the Plover totem that he had acquired during a visionary experience as his personal identifier (Figure 1). From then on he would exercise territorial jurisdiction over lands around the British Sault—a right that, he proclaimed, had been recognized in 1814 by John Askin Jr. and in 1833 by the lieutenant governor, Sir John Colborne.

During the 1830s the British Sault was still very much a frontier community. Despite an incoming white population and an Indian agency on the American side, Ojibwa band society on the Canadian shore remained relatively untrammeled by external laws or social mores. Intermarriages had taken place between the local Ojibwa, French, British, and Métis, yet the main Ojibwa community, clustered near the mouth of the Garden River, remained spatially and occupationally distinct from its Métis neighbors, whose dwellings straggled along the shoreline of the St. Mary's Channel opposite the rapids. It conformed poorly to frontier social models,
for it fitted neither the image of an exclusively fur-trading hunter-gatherer society nor the mold of a cohesive multiethnic community similar to those identified by Richard White for the Ohio Valley. The best one can say is that it comprised an aboriginal society in transition, although still distinctly Ojibwa in cultural character, with leaders who could remember when their people had been integral to events and who expected to be
consulted and heard during the birth pangs of the emerging social order, much as they had been at the height of the fur trade or during the major intercolonial wars.

The Garden River band rarely suffered economic shortages, despite the declining fur trade, which contributed to their considerable autonomy vis-à-vis both British and Americans. Unlike situations further to the west, where fur trade monopoly conditions prevailed, the Sault Ojibwa had access to independent trading establishments, as well as three Hudson’s Bay Company posts. Individual Ojibwa families preserved their own economic independence by maintaining winter hunting limits in the interior, in keeping with the family hunting territory system. In the spring they made maple sugar, planted corn, beans, and squash, and tended European-introduced crops such as potatoes in clearings near the coast. During the summer many traveled long distances in search of European goods in exchange for their furs, fish, and sugar. Each season elicited its own special economic endeavors and usually provided a small surplus to tide them over the beginning of the next. Their economy further paralleled that of the Métis in being at least partly based on the local whitefish and trout fisheries, which had sustained a thriving native commercial enterprise since the early French era. But since Sault chiefs had exercised territorial prerogatives that had been recognized by the French and, later, the British, the Ojibwa felt that they had a claim superior to that of the Métis in regard to local resources.

Shingwaukonse recognized that protecting his people’s diversified economy was the key to their continued independence. By regulating membership in his band, he indirectly reduced pressure on group resources, and he strongly opposed encroachments on his territorial prerogatives. He tried to examine issues from all sides. In keeping with traditional Ojibwa beliefs regarding power, he judged an idea by its effectiveness and saw little utility in amassing untried wisdom. He spoke with missionaries of many different Christian denominations but chose baptism in the Anglican faith after his son Buhkwujjenene was healed of a severe nasal hemorrhage following a prayer session. Aware of the strides in agriculture made by Ojibwa residing near the Credit River, he called for government assistance to help his people achieve the same results near Sault Ste. Marie. To him, missionaries of all faiths comprised potentially valuable mediators between his people and metropolitan society at large, to whom he directed numerous appeals for public assistance in building houses, schools, and sawmills.

In 1833 Lieutenant Governor Colborne promised to provide Shingwaukonse’s people with a farming instructor, a schoolteacher, a carpenter,
and sufficient funds to build twenty houses. When no aid materialized, however, the chief sought a broader audience. He also ceased to subscribe exclusively to Anglicanism and allowed his sons and daughters to exercise their own judgment in forming denominational attachments. When deliberating the feasibility of granting land for an Anglican church, he invited Roman Catholics as well as Anglicans to his council. Eventually not only the Church of England but also the Roman Catholic and Methodist Churches received land grants from Shingwaukonse to erect churches at Garden River. Shingwaukonse evidently retained his sense of balance and perspective within a teeming sea of ideological diversity by holding on to much of his faith in his traditional beliefs while gradually adding to the range of his religious knowledge through adoptions from Christianity. Yet the appeal of the Church of England, the religion of the British sovereign whose missionaries could be persuaded to open up channels to metropolitan corridors of power, kept the chief praising the merits of this particular faith to head chiefs at Lapointe and places further westward. It is testimony to the Garden River leader’s respected stature that petitions from Gitche Besheke at Lapointe, and other southwestern chiefs equally as prominent, made their way under his direction into the hands of the local Anglican missionary, and from there to the Indian Affairs Department. In order to express their wishes to the British government, Ojibwa leaders visited Garden River from as far away as the headwaters of the Red River.

To sustain his group’s economy from encroachment by outsiders, Shingwaukonse entered into a joint agreement with the Hudson’s Bay Company in 1834 and 1835 to protect native fisheries along the north shores of Lakes Huron and Superior against exploitation by American free traders. Then suddenly, in 1837, a more pressing challenge arose: The United States government announced its intention to remove the southwestern Ojibwa to lands beyond the Mississippi. Determined to aid those of his people who appealed to him for assistance and refuge, Shingwaukonse redoubled his efforts to enhance his community’s economic base so that it could sustain a potentially large influx of native immigrants from south of the border. Under the stress of this new mandate, he delegated one of his sons, Buhkwujjenene, as his group’s kekedowenine, or ombudsman; another of his sons, Ogista, as his ambassador or mishinaway; and John Bell and Louis Cadotte as his interpreters. Equipped with these new aides, he set out to inform as many missionary, governmental, and commercial agencies as possible about his plans.

But when these efforts to gain a listening ear proved no more efficacious than had the former, gauged to foster government assistance for an agricultural community, Shingwaukonse and his council embarked on
a new scheme. The chief’s vision of an aboriginal homeland on British soil embraced the native community in the broadest sense, and to this end he endeavored to instill a new catalytic unity of purpose between the two formerly separate groups, the Ojibwa and the Métis. By inviting Métis to come, join his group, and share carpentry and other technical skills, the Garden River band soon were able to engage in boatbuilding, coopering, and numerous other occupations previously unfamiliar to them (Figure 2).47 For their part, the Métis who exercised this option, most of whom had kin ties to the Ojibwa, had gained a valuable ally and spokesperson.

Shingwaukonse’s formal announcement in 1837 to the British government of his new plan shocked Indian Department officials who, under policy directives from Colborne’s successor, Sir Francis Bond Head, had anticipated removing the Ojibwa to an isolated mission station at Manitowaning on Manitoulin Island in northern Lake Huron.48 For many years afterward Shingwaukonse’s invitation to the Métis would repeatedly come under trenchant criticism. A charge was raised that he displayed a Machiavellian penchant for shifting identities whenever he desired a multiethnic following large enough to accomplish some self-interested goal, usually at government expense.49 Yet the preponderance of evidence suggests that he perpetually judged his own competence by his effectiveness in attaining group goals, not his own goals. Although claiming Métis ancestry, he remained Ojibwa in cultural orientation and showed his determination to preserve cherished Ojibwa values, to the degree that most Métis later stated that in 1837 they had rejected his offer, complaining they “were Indian enough without binding themselves to be under an Indian chief.” 50

By the time Upper Canada extended its jurisdiction to the land base at the Sault in 1845, the Ojibwa and Métis had become habituated to spending the winter logging in the bush together. Shingwaukonse always required that individuals and groups ask his permission before removing timber, so when a newly appointed Crown Lands agent, Joseph Wilson, began to seize logs cut by the native community, the chief declared such incidents little short of robbery. “[When] Mr. Wilson sells our wood & acts with us as he does, I feel as if he entered into my house and took without my leave what he might find therein,” he asserted.51 Yet only after 1845, when timber and mineral were sought by a new class of entrepreneurs, would Little Pine’s appeals for protection and aid rouse the government from its lethargy on the native claims issue. Until then Shingwaukonse frequently assumed the more humble role of mishinaway over the rank of respected chief. This enabled him to be flexible in his responses to new ideas, for it was he, rather than his Ojibwa and Métis supporters, who tended to be the source of new, integrating cultural ideas and constructs of the kind iden-
Figure 2. Métis fishermen at Sault Ste. Marie, ON. Photograph courtesy of the Archives of Ontario, Toronto.
tified in *The Middle Ground*. The chief constantly sought and processed new information on subjects he believed important to his people. While unable to read or write, he proved an alert student of events who was careful to check facts and to record his findings using mnemonic devices, some of which may have had their origins in Midewiwin practices. And he systematically persevered in his independent quest for knowledge, even when revelations proved disturbing.

Rejecting both British and American Indian policy as inadequate protection against the dangers of encapsulation, he hurled a provocative challenge at the Anglican and Roman Catholic missionaries residing on Manitoulin Island in 1841: “You are two Black Coats, now I want to know if our Saviour marked in the Bible, that the whites would journey towards the setting sun until they found a large Island in which there were many Indians living in rich country—that they should rob the natives of their animals, furs and land, after which the English and Americans should draw a line, from one to the other end of the Island and each take his share and do what he pleases with the Natives, I ask if that’s written in the Bible?”

From this point onward, he bypassed the Manitoulin Island missions as primary avenues of communication and sought to develop the most direct and personal linkages possible to metropolitan governmental agencies as well as other agencies.

**Shingwaukonse, Champion of the Unretreating Frontier**

Shingwaukonse shrewdly scanned the horizon for any activities that might in the least impinge on the ancient territorial prerogatives that he and other head chiefs had exercised at the Sault for over one hundred years. And there was good cause for such vigilance, for the Legislative Assembly of the United Canadas, with a blatant disregard for issues of native rights, in the spring of 1846 sent a provincial land surveyor by the name of Alexander Vidal to mark off allotments near the rapids. Incensed, Shingwaukonse asked Vidal to quit the area.

In response, the chief received a discouraging communication from the Indian Affairs Department: To arrange for a government inquiry into his complaints regarding mining and logging interests would be out of the question until he and the 126 individuals comprising his band moved to Manitoulin Island. Shingwaukonse initially refused to be upset by this turn of events. In a petition to the governor-general, Lord Metcalfe, he inquired by what authority a new threat, mining prospectors, had been allowed to stake mineral locations. The native individuals who had assisted
the miners in locating copper, iron, silver, and lead deposits wished to retain their traditional rights to these resources. He then cordially invited Metcalfe to meet with him in Montreal so they could discuss arrangements relating to mineral proprietorship, royalties, and dues. As for the directive to move to Manitoulin Island, the chief viewed it as unworthy of notice. “I want always to live and plant at Garden River,” he emphasized and “expect a share of what is found on my lands.”

However, when Indian Affairs warned Shingwaukonse not to proceed to Montreal but to move at once to Manitoulin Island, he realized that he faced a threat unlike any he had confronted before. “Already has the white man licked clean up from our lands the whole means of our subsistence, and now they commence to make us worse off. . . . I call God to witness in the beginning and do so now again and say that it was false that the land is not ours, it is ours,” he contended. One large mining location took in the whole area of the Garden River village. Since the chief had never negotiated in any way with the location’s claimants, he felt justified in driving exploring parties off the site.

The ideological sides had been drawn. The chief would act far differently from the stereotypical image of the politically defenseless Indian. By drawing on his broad pool of allies, native and nonnative alike, he attracted the notice of the press, and within three years his native claim had escalated into an international issue. Aspects of this contest have stubbornly defied historical analysis. Scholars dealing with the subject have come to different conclusions regarding the nature of forces behind events. All have agreed, however, that the contest arose as a frontier resistance to metropolitan control. And yet it constituted a form of native protest that evidenced none of the tumultuous characteristics of cult-induced movements such as the earlier Shawnee uprising. All in all, it presented a principled show of opposition, basically moderate and nonviolent. The tendency of factors motivating this native campaign to elude simple historical analysis arises from the fact that, as often as not, they drew on and complemented, rather than challenged, mid-nineteenth-century aspirations and goals.

Shingwaukonse and the Mining Companies

Tired of waiting for replies to written appeals, in the spring of 1848 Shingwaukonse and a small party of native supporters proceeded to Montreal to lay their claim in person before Lord Metcalfe’s successor, Lord Elgin. While in the metropolis the chief directed a barrage of complaints against certain miners who, he argued, had trespassed on his territory, blasted rock, and set fires that drove away game. At the same time he maintained
that agents of mining companies prevented the Ojibwa from cutting timber even though conditions of sale for the mine sites had not been fulfilled.63

To ascertain the validity of these grievances, Elgin sent Thomas G. Anderson, visiting superintendent of Indian Affairs from Cobourg, to the Sault in the summer to investigate the matter. During his interviews with Shingwaukonse and Peau de Chat, one of Shingwaukonse’s allies from Fort William, Anderson challenged the Ojibwa leaders to clarify by what authority they claimed the land and its resources.64 Visibly taken aback, Shingwaukonse declared that copper had been placed in his people’s lands as a gift from the Creator. He considered it part of an emerging plan by which the Ojibwa would be granted new sources of revenue by no less than divine mandate. To give his statements additional bite, the chief requested Louis Cadotte to send a translation of his speech to an American newspaper.

Anderson’s favoring of agricultural over industrial pursuits for the Ojibwa tended to blind him to the native population’s range of economic potentials. Rather than evidencing docile conformity either to the wishes of Anderson or to broader government wishes, Shingwaukonse’s press release demanded implementation of a system offering the Ojibwa compensation for a resource base they unquestionably saw as being under their own proprietorship and protection. They also expected mining revenues to be translated into future income for their communities: “The Great Spirit, we think, placed these rich mines on our lands, for the benefit of his red children, so that their rising generation might get support from them when the animals of the woods should have grown too scarce for our subsistence. We will carry out, therefore the good object of our Father, the Great Spirit. We will sell you lands, if you will give us what is right and at the same time, we want pay for every pound of mineral that has been taken off our lands, as well as for that which may hereafter be carried away.” 65

Traditionally, copper had been viewed by the Ojibwa as a preserve of formidable spiritual agencies, and its unsanctioned extraction and use were seen as detrimental to the cosmological foundations of the universe. Outcroppings were considered to be guarded by Buhkwujjenenesug, little wild people who resided in cliffs. Since he still subscribed, at least in part, to this cosmological order, Shingwaukonse would have been under the same ideological constraints regarding copper as other chiefs, but, equipped with new knowledge about Western culture and what he had learned of Christianity, he apparently felt confident enough to tackle the challenge of making mining a paying proposition for his people. This constituted a stance in which he firmly believed and from which he refused to deviate until his death. It would restore the Ojibwa to an integral place in the econ-
omy of the developing nation and would have broad regional repercussions. Peau de Chat of Fort William, Totomenai of Michipicoten, and Keokonse and Noquagabo of Thessalon stood behind him. Southwestern Ojibwa chiefs, among them such notable figures as Eshkebugecooshe of Leech Lake, Minnesota, and Gitche Besheke of Lapointe region, Wisconsin, sent messengers to Garden River to learn more concerning his plan.

Ultimately, Shingwaukonse’s most advantageous linkages lay through his association with a new frontier element, a small number of well-educated nonnative individuals interested in independently prospecting for copper north of Lakes Huron and Superior. The foremost member of this group was Allan Macdonell, a lawyer and mining prospector from Toronto, who understood something of Ojibwa society because of past family fur trade connections. But even more important, Macdonell maintained relations with Toronto’s growing legal and business community, the metropolitan press, and the corridors of political power.

A former shareholder in the Quebec and Lake Superior Mining Association, which operated copper mines near Michipicoten, Macdonell surveyed a mineral location north of the Sault and entered into a long-term lease regarding it with Shingwaukonse and another chief named Nebenagoching. By this lease’s terms, still pending government approval in 1848, the Ojibwa would receive a royalty of 2 percent on all mining proceeds, and the site in question would be returned to the band if not worked within five years. Macdonell’s arrangement, moreover, comprised only one of several systems introduced to the Ojibwa that were designed to capture and distribute potential mineral revenues to the native peoples. For instance, William John Keating, a former Indian agent from Amherstburg, recommended that leases of mineral locations near Michipicoten be based on the model operating in Cornwall, “where the Lord of the Manor always retains the Royalty, tho’ his returns vary with the profit of the mine.”

In the fall of 1848, according to Thomas G. Anderson’s son the Reverend Gustavus Anderson, the Anglican missionary at Garden River, Shingwaukonse had reextended his invitation to Métis families to join the Garden River community if they desired. By this time the chief had grown so impatient with government inactivity on the claims issue that he had prevailed upon Allan Macdonell to use his legal training to represent the Ojibwa’s position, to which the lawyer immediately responded by warning the mining companies against cutting any more timber on band property. Anderson and other government officials thus found themselves pitted against a formidable duo on the issue of aboriginal rights.

The following spring, during yet another visit to Lord Elgin in Montreal, the chief, accompanied by Macdonell, Ogista, Nebenagoching, and
Cadotte (Figure 3), made it clear that Anderson’s skepticism regarding the foundations of aboriginal rights constituted an insult not only to himself but to all persons of native descent. In an eloquent speech that was later translated and published in the *Montreal Gazette*, Shingwaukonse appealed to the government to forgo its former lethargy and instead participate actively in helping the Ojibwa secure what was theirs by the will of the Creator. “Assist us, then, to reap that benefit intended for us,” he proposed. “Enable us to do this, and our hearts will be great within, for we will feel that we are again a nation.” But instead of offering aid, the government stiffened its opposition to the Ojibwa’s position, a response that drew a veiled warning from the chief. Even “the most cowardly of animals though they feel destruction sure, will turn upon the hunter,” he cautioned. But he also made it clear that any form of coercion would only be a last resort.

Shingwaukonse’s importunity prompted a second government inquiry in September 1849. This time Indian Affairs dispatched two commissioners to the Upper Great Lakes region: Thomas G. Anderson, who had headed the investigation the previous year, and Alexander Vidal, whose surveying operations had been disrupted in 1847. Both were instructed to gain an estimate of the amount of compensation the Ojibwa would accept for their lands, but to discuss nothing more. A map drawn by these two commissioners of the north shore of Lake Superior demonstrated a remarkable thing (Figure 4): The boundaries of tracts, claimed by the bands along the coastline, lay flush against one another so that no land remained outside the Ojibwa’s territorial aegis. The native peoples had appropriated some of the richest mining country in Canada West as their inheritance. Since 1845 they had been instrumental in revealing outcroppings of copper, iron, gold, and silver to the white prospectors, and now they expected to glean the rewards of the prerogatives their leaders so forcefully upheld over these sites. For Shingwaukonse to have spoken in 1848 and 1849 on behalf of most of the bands along the north shore of Lake Superior testifies to the degree of faith his native constituents vested in his abilities as a power holder. And he and his close native allies in the resource business, Peau de Chat and Totemenai, had certainly gained attention. Public sympathy elicited by excerpts of Shingwaukonse’s speeches in the Montreal press alarmed those with Montreal-based mining interests, who feared that a treaty recognizing native rights to resources other than fur might endanger their title to the mineral locations.

Aware of the miners’ mounting fears during the course of his inquiries at the Sault, Vidal drew up a policy statement that negated the Ojibwa’s prerogatives even over their land base. Any forthcoming treaty
Figure 3. Unidentified men said to be (left to right) William B. Robinson, Shingwaukonse, and Nebenagogching. Photograph courtesy of Shingwauk Project, Algoma University College, Sault Ste. Marie, ON.
Figure 4. Mining localities in the vicinity of Sault Ste. Marie, ON, and on the northeastern shore of Lake Superior.
transaction, he argued, should not be viewed as "a purchase or surrender of territory but as the purchase of the right of hunting in and occupation [of the land]." During meetings with the Ojibwa, Vidal interpreted native impassivity while listening to his ideas not as a show of defiance, as it actually may have been, but as the consequence of manipulations by "designing whites." This led the commissioner to portray the Ojibwa leaders as ignorant and incompetent. Native irresoluteness, he held, required the imposition of an "ultimatum of the government" upon the bands north of Lakes and Superior.

On 15 October, when Vidal trenchantly demanded that Shingwaukonse place an evaluation on his "occupancy rights," the chief abruptly interrupted the discussion by stressing his unfamiliarity with the terms Vidal proposed. Before answering, he would have to consult with his people, he concluded. Then at the meeting the next day, Shingwaukonse terminated all further meetings with the officials, and there matters stood until the autumn of 1849. The chief's eventual response to what he felt to be a colossal affront to his people's rights, intelligence, and aspirations was characteristic of him; it was deliberate and well planned. In the fall a party consisting of Shingwaukonse, Allan Macdonell, Macdonell's brother Angus, another lawyer from Toronto named Wharton Metcalfe, Chief Nebenagoching, four Metis leaders, and about twenty-five other native individuals journeyed northward up the Lake Superior coast by boat and on the night of 14 November peaceably dispossessed the Quebec and Montreal Mining Association of its holdings at Mica Bay, not far from Michipicoten. The company manager shipped the residents of the Mica Bay community by schooner to the Sault, and the native party and their legal assistants held the mine site until the spring of 1850. Troops were sent to the Sault, although no violence ensued. Shingwaukonse and his closest native supporters surrendered voluntarily to justices of the peace and then proceeded under escort to Toronto. Once in the city, they were placed in jail and were released a few days later by the chief justice, Sir John Beverley Robinson, a relative through marriage to Macdonell who argued that the party had been arrested illegally. After continued government vacillation about what course to pursue, in 1851 the group received an official pardon.

John Bonner, the mine manager, who presided over the evacuation of the mining company's employees and their families, charged that Macdonell desired to use his position as an intermediary with the Ojibwa to secure leases that would be profitable only to himself. From other sources, however, it appears that Macdonell may have been disinterested. The Hudson's Bay Company factor, William MacTavish, noted that Mac-
donell repeatedly had stated that if the Ojibwa could obtain better terms from others, he would have "great pleasure" in relinquishing his interest in his own claim. In a letter to the superintendent general of Indian Affairs in December, Macdonell described his role with regard to the Ojibwa in patron-client terms, yet implicit in his statements lay indications of a reciprocal relationship between himself and the chiefs of a different order than that which usually obtained between a lawyer and those whom he represented. With an intensity of purpose, evidently imbued with a dynamism derived from Shingwaukonse's own vision for the future, Macdonell set out to formulate a case for aboriginal rights that he eventually anticipated testing in the courts.

Viewed against a background of longer-term events, the Mica Bay mine takeover emerges as an act of protest against government insensitivity toward native hopes for the future. From this perspective, the dispossession of the mine constitutes a brief incident in what was, on the whole, a well-organized native claims campaign. At no time were Shingwaukonse and his allies opposed to resource exploration and development; they simply wanted their fair share. They hoped to preserve an environment in which their community structures could evolve gradually to meet new economic and political challenges. They demanded a say in the regulation of local logging, fishing, and mining activities directly affecting their lives. They also wanted to conserve the potentialities of their highly diversified resource base. In Macdonell they had found a champion for these interests, for the lawyer's political proclivities led him to oppose domination of the hinterland by powerful monopolizing metropolitan interests, and he genuinely sympathized with the Ojibwa's struggle to preserve their rights to the land and its resources.

Macdonell was connected by marriage both to John Beverley Robinson and to William B. Robinson, the attorney general's brother, who was selected by the government to preside over the signing of the Robinson treaties at Sault Ste. Marie on 7 and 9 September 1850. Macdonell's personal connections probably cast a moderating influence over events subsequent to the Mica Bay affair, and they even may have helped bring about the pardon. But one cannot ignore the fact that the Reform government, owing to its tardiness in responding to the native claim, would have found itself in an acutely embarrassing position if it had not acted quickly to draw attention away from the claims issue. The arrival of the native party in Toronto had caused considerable public excitement, and the fact that Shingwaukonse had fought in the War of 1812 as a British ally and now was on trial by the Canadian government circulated in American as well as Canadian newspapers. Not surprisingly, the government seriously
searched for an approach that would silence the Ojibwa’s demands once and for all.

Neither the lieutenant governor nor the officials present at the signing of the Robinson treaties accorded any recognition to native demands or aspirations. Moreover, interior Ojibwa groups, whose trapping livelihood depended on the Hudson’s Bay, were exposed to pressures to which their relatively more economically autonomous coastal native neighbors were not subject. Informed that the Hudson’s Bay Company fully backed the government’s position, many interior bands distanced themselves from, or lapsed into a state of passive defiance during, the Robinson treaty negotiations, when it appeared that the government’s will would prevail over Shingwaukonse’s proposed scheme. The final treaty terms merely provided bands with a lump-sum payment, small annuities, and a reserve system based on the same model as that already established in southern Ontario, and stipulated that the Ojibwa could continue hunting and fishing on ceded lands not yet sold or leased by the Crown. Also incorporated was a promise that individuals would receive an annuity of one pound, or more, per capita should revenue from the surrendered tracts enable the government, without loss, to increase payments. Yet by depriving native leadership of its traditional prerogatives over lands and resources, the terms had rendered bands susceptible to encroachment from many quarters.

Surveys disregarded treaty descriptions of reserves to the extent that several mineral locations, originally recognized as lying on band property, afterward lay outside reserve boundaries. Meanwhile claimants to locations still considered to lie on reserve land pillaged both mineral and timber without paying fees or dues and then abandoned the denuded sites. These men often prevented the Ojibwa from cutting wood even for personal use and challenged band members’ rights to local fisheries that native people had frequented for generations.

Initially unaware of this new lack of protection for their interests, Shingwaukonse and Macdonell entered into negotiations with a local merchant to begin a native lumbering business. To make their transaction legal, they apprised Indian Affairs of their plan and requested assistance in purchasing machinery for a sawmill. A final, decisive blow to their venture fell when the Legislative Assembly introduced a bill that made “inciting Indians or half-breeds” an offense punishable by up to five years’ incarceration in the provincial penitentiary. Wryly branded by the Ojibwa’s legal counselor as “an Act to procure the conviction of Allan Macdonell,” the bill, which passed into law in June 1853, not only effectively terminated Macdonell’s association with his former native clients but also prohibited the Ojibwa from seeking legal counsel in the future.
His petition regarding a sawmill ignored, Shingwaukonse prepared yet another direct personal appeal, this time to Queen Victoria. On learning that the government adamantly refused to allow any Ojibwa immigrants from the United States to settle at Garden River, Shingwaukonse, with a local merchant’s help, headed up a fund-raising campaign in 1853 for an expedition to England. The government’s rejection of a petition from band head chiefs in Minnesota and Wisconsin must have cut him deeply. Ogista had acted as Shingwaukonse’s mishinaway in inviting southwestern Ojibwa leaders such as Eshkebugecooshe from Leech Lake and Ahmous—a fifth-generation descendant of Ketchenezuhyah, an eighteenth-century Crane chief—who resided at Lac du Flambeau. Now they had agreed to remove, along with two thousand of their people. Not to act effectively might suggest to those for whom he felt responsible that he ultimately lacked power or control, a fate the chief probably refused to even contemplate. So, although afflicted with gangrene in his back and “not expected to live,” the old warrior roused himself sufficiently to set off toward Toronto in early June. Unfortunately, the eighty-year-old chief traveled only as far as Penetanguishene when he and his party were forced to turn back in September, owing to his declining health. He died in November of 1854.

The outcome of the Robinson treaties had made Shingwaukonse restless. He had sought to do everything he could to restore to his people some measure of their independence within the nation-state, and before his death he had transmitted this intensity of purpose to his sons. In the fall of 1854 Ogista led another brief attack on mining property north of the Sault that involved firing some shots past employees working for the Quebec and Lake Superior Mining Association holdings on Michipicoten Island, but the time for such activities had passed. Ogista soon modified his behavior under the pressure of traditional group checks and balances to emerge as staunch a defender of aboriginal rights as his father had been before him.

Confronting Internal Colonialism

Their heady expectations of long-term sustained yields from Lake Superior timber and mines dashed, Ogista and those who succeeded him faced far more formidable obstacles than their predecessors. Shingwaukonse’s vision had embraced the bands along the entire north shore of Lake Superior, and much of the north shore of Lake Huron, since band leaders from Fort William eastward to the French River had come to repose their trust in the potential efficacy of his ideas and actions. Now these same bands faced a
future of residing on small reserves, with little control over local resources. With the passing of reserve lands from native to government control, even revenue from reserve mining and logging operations was irrevocably lost or fell into trust funds that were frittered away on surveys or the building of colonization roads primarily to benefit white settlement. Native fisheries were alienated, timber was taken without band permission, and the earlier system of cutting wood on individual family lots was replaced by block cutting, which denuded the reserve’s landscape and threatened the economic viability of the traditional family winter group. Local political lobbying compelled the band to cede its best farming areas in the late 1850s. Then in the early twentieth century, when reserves in the Sault vicinity became too small to support their growing populations, bands had to purchase lands from the tracts that had been taken away earlier. An elective system was unilaterally imposed on the Garden River band in 1891 following Ogista’s death. Not only did it structurally marginalize chiefs and councils away from the political mainstream, but it also subjected them to insidious external campaigns to render them almost wholly powerless insofar as local resource issues were concerned. In 1916 this fact became all too evident when one active and educated chief, George Kabaosa, after leading a campaign to gain a measure of community control over his reserve’s gravel and timber stores, found himself suddenly deprived of his status by government fiat, despite the protests of those who had elected him.

What do these events say about the nature of the leadership evidenced by Shingwaukonse and his successors? That, ultimately, it was weak and ineffectual? Or that, though constrained by a legal system enshrined in successive Indian Acts, it displayed surprising resilience? On reviewing the evidence, the second verdict appears most credible, since Garden River’s leadership consistently exhibited faithfulness both to Shingwaukonse’s vision for the future and to traditional group values and norms. A long-term perspective is required in order to substantiate this contention, however. Otherwise the premise is difficult to uphold, since 1850 Garden River leaders were almost always portrayed in official documents and press reports as obstructing the public good whenever they espoused any economic occupation other than trapping or farming, regardless of the ways in which they framed their appeals. Modern social science models also have done native communities such as Garden River an injustice, for they have similarly focused too narrowly on transactions having to do with the extraction and exchange of only a few crucial but basically subsistence-level resources, such as fur, fish, or farming produce. Yet Ojibwa culture has never precluded native interest in a wide range of resources on lands falling under the aegis of band governments, nor has it prevented com-
munities from calling for assistance in the form of management skills and technological infrastructure. Instead, the Ojibwa continuously sought to protect what they had until they could develop it fully on their own terms. When it came to preserving sustained returns from their local resource base, their chiefs proved tireless defenders, despite repeated disappointments. Shingwaukonse, the most visible and vocal of this contingent, was also one of the most inclusive in his outlook, for he called out to Ojibwa and Métis leaders throughout the Upper Great Lakes region for assistance in actualizing his vision. His motivations seem to have lain in a tendency, sweeping over the Upper Great Lakes native community at the time, to favor inclusiveness over exclusiveness—a trend that had even pervaded the highly conservative Midéwiwin forum.99 It has long been recognized that major social and ideological changes tend to find their roots in broad social movements, and it is anticipated that this will prove no less true in native history than in mainstream history. Future studies will likely show that Ojibwa chiefs in the Robinson treaties area continued to mount collective campaigns after 1850 to try to extract what they viewed as a fair share of local resource revenues for their people. When asked for his views on this subject in the early 1980s, ex-councillor Fred E. Pine Sr. said: "Of course we did! After all, what is his [the government and mining company’s] right? It [the law] can be wrong even if it wears a crown of gold. And what is gold if it means that? He’s stepping over God.”100

Elders at Garden River further maintained that Shingwaukonse’s scheme respected the interests of all parties involved in it, whereas Canadian Indian policy in practice tended to treat reserves as unprotected common lands. Had sustained native protests not been mounted in opposition, what has been termed “the tragedy of the commons” would almost certainly have played itself out over and over.101 In refusing to digress from its cherished goals, Garden River leadership evidenced astounding resilience, since Shingwaukonse’s style of disinterested leadership in pursuit of collective goals continued to guide action even within the bureaucratized political forum established after 1890. Owing to Shingwaukonse’s past successes in establishing linkages with government, church, and commercial agencies, the band had many avenues through which to pursue its interests. And because of outside help, sometimes from unexpected quarters, small but important victories occurred insofar as native control over local resources was concerned—certainly enough to negate the insidious view that the Ojibwa were inherently incapable of launching and managing economic ventures.102 Such instances provide welcome precedents today when government-community co-management has become a key term in policy formation respecting economic development on aboriginal lands.
For almost a century and a half, Shingwaukonse’s ideas, actions, and goals have inspired native decision making in the Sault region. And the maintenance of a milieu congenial to the survival of group values remains a persistent theme at Garden River. The end of the intercolonial wars, the decline of the fur trade, the rise of the Canadian nation-state, and the advent of mining and logging heralded an elaboration of ideological concepts among the Ojibwa, as native chiefs and councils adopted new ideas derived from European precedents and, as far as possible, shaped them to serve Ojibwa ends. But throughout all these changes, the Garden River band tenaciously held that its leadership must first and foremost seek out economic and social opportunities for those for whom it was responsible, in line with the Ojibwa belief system concerning power, regardless of the nature of any chief’s personal interests. And even today, there have been few departures from this fundamental cultural premise governing group expectations in regard to leadership. Self-interest is viewed as antithetical to creative thinking on important native issues. Since aspects of the traditional worldview regarding power and its proper use continue to inform Ojibwa responses to external agencies and events, Shingwaukonse remains an influential role model for his successors to emulate. Sometimes described as a “tree” under whose caring branches the native people could flourish and develop, he had a vision for the future that in its inclusiveness, comprehensiveness, and respect for native potential captured the imagination of modern native politicians. For, as Fred E. Pine Sr., a fourth-generation descendant of the chief, concludes: “He was a brave man, he wasn’t scared of disruption. And he knew he might fail. But that didn’t stop him. As one story said, he had a purpose, a gift. He followed his goals. He couldn’t turn back. ‘And then what kind of man would I be?’ he said. ‘You cannot leave the path. . . . You wouldn’t be remembered.’” 103

Notes

2 Alfred A. Cave examines evidences of social disequilibrium that permeated Ohio Valley societies following the failure of the Shawnee Prophet’s resistance ("The Failure of the Shawnee Prophet’s Witch-Hunt," Ethnohistory 42 [1995]: 445–75).
4 Schoolcraft, Historical and Statistical Information, 4:639.
5 See, for example, Ruth Landes, “The Personality of the Ojibwa,” Character and Personality 6 (1937):51–60. Landes’s personality studies tended to em-
phrasize irrational traits in her respondents’ characters, even though much of her fieldwork was carried out during Depression years, when those Ojibwa she interviewed would have been experiencing economic and social hardship. The author is indebted to Joan Lovisek for sharing her ideas on this subject.


9 The author is indebted to Ex-Councillor Daniel Erskine Pine Sr., Ex-Councillor Fred E. Pine Sr., Ex-Councillor Mark Pine, and Ex-Chief Richard Pine Sr. for these insights. Another role is that of *tebikkoonegawenene* (overseer or judge). The Ojibwa word for “councillor,” *gagaunsoongad*, may cover several of these roles, which are mentioned in numerous published sources, among them Frederick Frost, *Sketches of Indian Life* (Toronto, 1904), 143; and Johann Georg Kohl, *Kitche-Gami: Wanderers around Lake Superior* (Minneapolis, MN, 1956), 160–61.


11 The term “internal colonialism” was first applied in a broad sense to the context of Canada’s indigenous peoples in Peter Carstens, “Coercion and Change,” in *Canadian Society*, ed. Richard Ossenberg, (Scarborough, ON, 1971).


14 Charles M. Johnston, ed., *The Valley of the Six Nations* (Toronto, 1964), xxxvi–xxxviii. In association with several officials of the British Indian Department, Brant forged the Ojibwa, Wyandot, Delaware, Shawnee, Miami, Mingoe, Potawatomi, Mississauga, and Munsey into a loose military confederation, with each member nation taking a particular identifying symbol. The Ojibwa joined united under the mark of the Crane. “To the Commissioner of the United States,” Resolutions of a Full Council Held at the Foot of the Miamis Rapids, 27 July 1793, National Archives of Canada (henceforth NAC), RG 10, vol. 8, 8525.

15 Ojibwa support for resistance waned, however, when warriors fell ill while residing with the Shawnee Prophet during the winter of 1808–9. William Warren, *History of the Ojibway Nation* (Minneapolis, MN, 1970), 324; Edmund Danziger, *Chippewa of Lake Superior* (Norman, OK, 1978); R. David Edmunds, *The Shawnee Prophet* (Lincoln, NE, 1980), 76. It has been argued that dependence on the fur trade militated against sustained Ojibwa support of the Shawnee uprising, yet it might also be contended that the Ojibwa recognized strategic assets in their geographic position between two major growing national powers, and when conditions favored negotiation and compromise, they abandoned the Shawnee Prophet and his allies.


19 William Henry Puthuff, American Commander at Mackinac, to the Secretary of War, 29 November 1816, National Archives, Washington, DC (henceforth NA), RG 75, vol. 1, 350–55.


23 To exchange theorists, power is seen as the capacity to achieve valued goals in a valid transactional forum.

24 One study of this nature by Edward J. Hedican focuses on the northern Ojibwa community of Collins, whose members are mostly nonstatus and hence encapsulated and unconstrained by the terms of the Canadian Indian Act. Hedican views communities such as Collins as crucibles in which innovative leadership policies and indigenous political structures may emerge as leaders seek to establish permanent linkages with the state in their pursuit of community economic development (*The Ogoki River Guides: Emergent Leadership among the Northern Ojibwa* [Waterloo, ON, 1986]).

25 Shingwaukonse himself told of these travels, especially during the 1830s, when he was meeting with chiefs and collecting data in the capacity of a mishiniway. For example, his name turns up in Vincent Roy’s Vermilion Lake, Minnesota, fur trade account book in the 1830s. George Fulford, “The Pictographic Account Book of an Ojibwa Fur Trader,” in *Papers of the Twenty-third Algonquian Conference*, ed. William Cowan (Ottawa, ON, 1992), 190–233.

26 One expedition against the Dakota that involved Shingwaukonse occurred in
Shingwaukonse

1810. John Askin Jr. to William Claus, 8 May 1810, NAC, RG 10, vol. 27, p. 16, o, 70, reel C-11, 007. Dr. Oronhyatekha, a Mohawk, learned while visiting Garden River that around 1809 the Ojibwa had held a council at Mackinac regarding which side to join in the event of war between the United States and Britain, and the gathering found its allegiances split. A wampum belt was made to commemorate the event, and Shingwaukonse became its keeper. F. Barlow Cumberland, Catalogue and Notes on the Oronhyatekha Historical Collection (Toronto, [1910?]), 26.

27 Even though he was disposed to side with those hostile to the Americans, Shingwaukonse was expected to subordinate personal self-interest to band considerations. Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, Summary Narrative, ed. Mentor L. Williams (New York, 1973), 77.

28 Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs of a Residence of Thirty Years with the Indian Tribes on the American Frontier A.D. 1812 to A.D. 1842 (New York, 1975), 110, 570.

29 All those bearing the same totemic mark treated each other as siblings regardless of which village or band they belonged to in the Upper Great Lakes Ojibwa community. Since a chief's sons and grandsons tended to remain with their paternal unit, however, certain totems tended to be associated with specific locales over time. But while totemic group exogamy prevailed, band and village exogamy did not, so that large bands became composite over time as male individuals joined the unit through marriage. In 1850 each Ojibwa person at Garden River possessed one of the four local totemic designations: Plover, Crane, Sturgeon, Hawk and Plover.

30 Oral traditions state that Shingwaukonse's mother, Ogimaqua, was a daughter or granddaughter of Great Crane, who died about 1770. They also link John Johnston with Shingwaukonse by arguing that a brother of Waubojeeg, whose daughter married John Johnston, provided companionship for Shingwaukonse's mother after she had separated from Shingwaukonse's father. Kitche Nokay, a chief possessing the caribou totem, had moved to Lapointe during the late French regime. This man had a son, Mamongazida, or Loon's Foot, whose son Waubojeeg, or White Otter, became John Johnston's father-in-law on the trader's marriage to Oshawuscadawaqua, Waubojeeg's daughter. John Johnston's mention of a “Mrs. Sayers,” who was a daughter of Mamongazida, brings to mind an Isabella Sayers, baptized at the age of sixty-five into the Anglican faith at Garden River in 1835. Schoolcraft Papers, “Journal of John Johnston, 19 June, 1829,” on microfilm in the library of Michigan State University, East Lansing; “Report of Baptisms, Marriages, and Burials at Sault Ste. Marie, 6th October 1833–15th March, 1835,” Fifth Annual Report of the Society for Converting and Civilizing the Indians of Upper Canada, for the Year Ending October, 1835. Another well-known chief named Mamongazida, of the Loon totem, resided at Fond du Lac, Minnesota. For references to this chief, see Rebecca Kugel, “Religion Mixed with Politics: The 1836 Conversion of Mang'osid of Fond du Lac,” Ethnohistory 37 (1990): 126–57. This man was the brother-in-law of Charles Oakes Ermatinger, a Sault trader, but was not a direct relation of the Mamongazeeda who resided near Lapointe. The Fond du Lac Mamongazida was the son of Katawabedai, or Broken Tooth, head chief of the Loon totem of Sandy Lake, Minnesota, whose daughter married Ermatinger at the British Sault. Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, 298.

Shingwaukonse could trace a cognatic relationship through his mother
to all Ojibwa bearing the Crane totem in the Upper Great Lakes area. William Warren notes that during the early French era, in the late seventeenth century, a chief named Ketchenezuhyauh, bearing the Crane symbol as his designating mark, lived at the Sault but later moved near Lapointe, Wisconsin. One of this man’s younger sons, Shadawish, became a “pioneer towards the headwaters of the Wisconsin River,” and it is interesting to note that Shadawish’s grandson, Ahmous, or Little Bee, had dealings with Shingwaukonse in the early 1850s. Warren, History of the Ojibway Nation, 131–32, 316–17. See also “Petition to the British Government from Ashkepogegosh and Twenty Other Chiefs, 1853,” NAC, RG 10, vol. 198, pt. 1, 116289.

Schoolcraft notes that Kecheokanejeed, or Great Crane, the man from whom Shingwaukonse’s mother, Ogemaqua, traced her ancestry, had at least four sons. One of the eldest of these, Maidosagee, in turn had at least eight sons, among whom Shingabaw’osin, or the Image Stone, retained head chief-tainship at the Sault until his death in 1828, when he was succeeded by a younger brother named Kaygayosh. On Kaygayosh’s death, Francis Oshawano, also known as Cassaquadung—who was a grandson of one of Maidosagee’s brothers—assumed leadership on the American side of the rapids, while Shingwaukonse became head chief at Garden River on the British side. Nebenagoching, or Joseph Sayers, became head chief at the British Sault. Nebenagoching’s father, White Crane, had been a son of Maidosagee.

The Sault and the Lapointe Cranes probably were related in the distant past to a common ancestral group that split apart during the early French regime. It is fairly evident that the two descendant branches kept communicating with one another on a regular basis.

Shingwaukonse’s paternal ancestry is very difficult to trace, since there are so many conflicting stories regarding it. Some infer that John Askin Sr. of Mackinac may have been his father. J. G. Kohl states that about 1836 he heard that Shingwaukonse’s father had been a British officer, or a Scotsman. But this may have referred to Shingwaukonse’s attachment to John Askin Sr. and John Askin Jr. See Kohl, Kitchi-Gami, 374–77. Other stories point to Jean Baptiste Barthe, of Sault Ste. Marie. But it is likely that Shingwaukonse’s father was a trader named Lavoine Barthe. Ex-councillor Daniel E. Pine Sr., the grandson of Shingwaukonse, and the son of one of Little Pine’s sons who was actually called “John Askin.” Interview with ex-councillor Pine Sr., 13 June 1983. There is some documentary support that Shingwaukonse may have been the son of the Métis trader Lavoine Barthe, who was related to both Jean Baptiste Barthe Sr. and John Askin Sr., since Askin married one of Jean Baptiste Barthe’s sisters. Shingwaukonse adopted the name Augustin Bart (Barthe) at the time of the 1820 American treaty signing at the rapids, and one of his sons, whose Ojibwa name was Tegoosh, was also called Pierre Lavoine. For a detailed discussion of Shingwaukonse’s possible paternity, see Janet E. Chute, “A Century of Native Leadership: Shingwaukonse and His Heirs” (Ph.D. diss., McMaster University, 1986), 94.

Regarding Shingwaukonse’s independence from the United States, see Schoolcraft, Historical and Statistical Information, 1:112; Schoolcraft, Personal Memoirs, 549. It should be noted that Midewiwin practitioners exercised their powers not only for their immediate group but on behalf of all who solicited their services. Southwestern Ojibwa leaders may have prevailed on Shingwau-
Shingwaukonse during a four-day Midéwiwin ceremony to speak and work on behalf of their interests. See Kohl, *Kitchi-Gami*, 380–82.

The information on Shingwaukonse’s acquisition of the Plover totem was first gained from ex-councillor Daniel Erskine Pine Sr. in August 1982. I think one has to be very careful about basing one’s views of the totemic system on William Warren’s description of it in his *History of the Ojibway Nation*. I expect that the five totems Warren argues were the earliest in the Upper Great Lakes area actually refer to a meeting of power holders, sometime in the past, who bore those totems Warren mentions as identifiers. William Warren and Buhkwujjenene, one of Shingwaukonse’s sons, actually were related, as Buhkwujjenene married Marguerite Cadotte, the daughter of Michael Cadotte and the granddaughter of Jean Baptiste Cadotte. It is therefore surprising that William Warren would not have mentioned the Plover totem when he was related to a man who bore it. Lewis Henry Morgan and Henry Rowe Schoolcraft only refer to the Snipe totem. Morgan’s term, however, is *chueskweskewa*, which at Garden River means “plover,” not “snipe,” which is *muhnomenekashe* (*Ancient Society* [Chicago, 1877], 166). Paul Pine, Ogista’s son, who acted as Morgan’s guide in his researches into beaver habits near Marquette, Michigan, may have been his source for this totemic designation.


33 *Waubejejauk*, or White Crane, a leading chief of the Sault band who had been killed during the War of 1812, had married a daughter of a French trader, Perrault. His son, Nebenagoching, became a chief at the British Sault. Numerous other examples of this type may be given.

34 White, *The Middle Ground*.

35 It could not be called a composite society similar to the Glaize and other transitional period settlements in the Ohio Valley, since only one nation, the Ojibwa, represented predominantly by one totemic group, the Cranes, characterized Sault aboriginal society—traits that superficially made it appear quite homogeneous. The Ojibwa would assimilate only Métis who adopted their customs and mores. For a description of the Glaize during the late eighteenth century, see Helen Hornbeck Tanner, “The Glaize in 1792: A Composite Indian Community,” *Ethnohistory* 25 (1978): 15–39.

36 These posts were located at Michipicoten, Sault Ste. Marie, and LaCloche.


38 In the late 1840s Métis descendants of the independent Sault traders hoped that land arrangements made by their ancestors in the 1750s and 1760s with Great Crane might help them secure their own holdings. See, for instance, “Affidavit to the Governor from Louis Nolin and Louis Gorneau, November, 1847,” Regional Collections, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Alexander Vidal Papers, affidavit in Alexander Vidal’s Memorandum Book.


96 Janet E. Chute

41 Fourth Annual Report of the Society for Converting and Civilizing the Indians &c (York, Canada West, 1834).


43 The Reverend William McMurray to George Johnston, 7 May 1833, George Johnston Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library.

44 Shingwaukonse traveled widely to participate in native political councils and ceremonies, as oral traditions at Garden River still attest. That he never completely relinquished his Midewiwin beliefs is evident in the fact that he continued to possess Midewiwin bark scrolls throughout his lifetime and that his descendants, even as late as 1985, retained knowledge of such traditional religious ceremonies. In the mid-1850s one of his sons testified that the chief had destroyed his Midewiwin paraphernalia only shortly before his death. Kohl, Kitchi-Gami, 384.

45 Incidents of such joint cooperation may be found in the Hudson's Bay Company correspondence books and post journals for 1834 and 1835. Microfilm copies of records of the Hudson's Bay Company Archives, Winnipeg, MB (henceforth HBCA), NAC, MG 20, Correspondence Books, Sault Ste. Marie, B/194/b/9/1834-35; B/194/b/10/1835-36; and NAC, MG 20, Post Journal, Sault Ste. Marie, ON, B/194/a/8/1834-35.

46 The author is indebted to Bruce White for his kindness in bringing his report “The Regional Context of the Removal Order” to her attention. Prepared in 1993 for the Mille Lacs band of Ojibwa, the report employs American sources in discussing events leading up to, and surrounding, the American Removal Order of 1830. According to James Clifton, the United States government began a limited removal in Wisconsin but later gave up its plans to relocate the Wisconsin Ojibwa. It is these events, between 1837 and 1853, that had affected Shingwaukonse’s activities. For information on the Wisconsin removal, see James A. Clifton, “Wisconsin Death March: Explaining the Extremes of Old Northwest Indian Removal,” Transactions of the Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts and Letters 75: 1-39.

47 Despite the fact that some Métis families, such as the Nolins and Birons, were descended from the scions of independent trading houses, most were poor. Their principal sources of income were the commercial fishery and seasonal wage work for the Hudson’s Bay Company. To a lesser extent they farmed small plots, guided, and trapped fur. Some resorted to smuggling liquor across the international border. Yet they also possessed valuable skills that the Ojibwa lacked. Métis women could weave cloth, spin and sew, churn butter, and tend domestic animals; Métis men were adept at carpentry and boatbuilding. They also knew more than their Ojibwa counterparts about world events and sought to make their community part of the larger sphere. To this end several family heads educated in Lower Canada repeatedly drafted petitions on behalf of their community to the provincial government or the Roman Catholic bishop regarding local land or church affairs. The boundary between the Ojibwa and Métis communities was often ambiguous, however. For example, in an 1835 petition to the lieutenant governor, Sir John Colborne, numerous
signees, including Shingwaukonse’s son, Pierre Lavoine, and Nebenagoching, the Crane chief at the British Sault, argued that the Anglican missionary had prevented them from cutting wood to construct a Roman Catholic chapel, even though they had “previously obtained the consent of the principal chief [Shingwaukonse] for so doing.” “To His Excellency, Sir John Colborne, K.B., 1835,” Canadian Roman Catholic Archdiocesan Archives, Toronto, AC 2402, Bishop McDonnell Papers.

48 First Speech of Chinquakous—Young Pine, 1837, James Givens Papers, Baldwin Room, Toronto Metropolitan Library. In the fall of 1835 Sir Francis Bond Head succeeded Sir John Colborne as lieutenant governor. After a tour of Indian missions in Upper Canada, Bond Head declared that the idea of establishing yet another government-supported settlement at Sault Ste. Marie would result in a costly and probably fruitless endeavor, and he suggested removing the entire Garden River band to Manitoulin Island. Shingwaukonse was perturbed that Bond Head did not visit the Sault mission, however. At this time there were government plans to remove the Sault Métis to St. Joseph’s Island in northern Lake Huron. The opposition of Britain’s Protestant missionary societies to Bond Head’s removal scheme led to a return to the former civilization program initiated by Sir John Colborne. As a result, Bond Head’s successor, Sir George Arthur, directed that axes and other tools be sent to Garden River as a token of the government’s good faith in the community. Extract from a letter from Sir George Arthur, lieutenant governor, to Chief Shinquackouce, dated Gov’t. House, York, 19 September 1839, NAC, RG 1, E5, ECO file 1157, vol. 8, 1848.


51 Shingwaukonse to George Ironside, 20 February 1846, NAC, RG 10, vol. 157, 40407.

52 Information used in Midewiwin ritual was recorded by the use of mnemonic symbols inscribed on wooden boards or birth bark scrolls.

53 For instance, when a zealous frontier preacher declared the end of the world at hand and provided the chief with a firm date for the event, Shingwaukonse simply cut notches in his pipestem until the designated day arrived, and after watching the sky carefully, he decided the whole affair was a hoax. Report of the Reverend F. A. O’Meara, 19 December 1843, AO, MG 25, Strachan Papers.

54 Statement translated by John Bell, Thomas G. Anderson Papers, s 29, Baldwin Room, Toronto Metropolitan Library.

55 Alexander Vidal to D. B. Papineau, 17 April 1846. Letters received, General Land Commissioner, AO, RG 1, ser. A-1-6, 21675; Reply to communication of Alexander Vidal, AO, RG 1, ser. A-1-5, 21678 (MS 563, microfilm reel 22).


57 Metcalfe had recently been raised to the peerage and so was addressed as “Lord.”

58 Petition of Chief Chingwauk, June 10, 1846 (Petition No. 156), NAC, RG 10, vol. 612.

59 Petition of William Shinguaconce [Shingwaukonse], Henry Shinguaconce
In November 1846 the Executive Council had authorized the sale of approximately thirty large mining locations along the north shore of Lakes Huron and Superior in keeping with the terms of an order-in-council passed earlier in May. Each location had to conform in size to sixty-four hundred acres to accord with a government standard set to discourage speculation and prevent minor entrepreneurial interests from competing with powerful Montreal-controlled mining companies. A copy of the order-in-council was sent to Joseph Wilson, the land agent and Indian agent at the Sault. NAC, RG 10, vol. 159, 91442–43.

George Desbarats to Major Campbell, 10 May 1847, Indian Affairs Records. Copies in the Indian File at the Bruce Mines Museum, Bruce Mines, ON.


T. G. Anderson to Major Campbell, 9 October 1849, NAC, RG 10, vol. 173, 100434. Anderson was an official of the Indian Affairs Department.


It has been held that Allan Macdonell did not practice law from 1837 to 1858. Donald Swainson, “Allan Macdonell,” in The Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 13 vols. (Toronto, 1982), 11: 552–55. Macdonell, however, informally assisted the Ojibwa legally from 1849 to 1853 and perhaps even afterward.

“The Report of Commissioners A. Vidal and Thomas G. Anderson on a visit to Indians on North Shore Lake Huron and Superior for purpose of investigating their claims to territory bordering on these Lakes. Appendix,” AO, Irving Papers, MU 1464 26/31/04.


The local Anglican missionary noted on 23 January 1849, “Chief Shingwaukonse gave them leave to settle here” at Garden River. Diary of the Reverend Gustavus Anderson, 26 August 1848 to 23 May 1849, Thomas G. Anderson Papers, s 29, Folder 8, Baldwin Room, Metropolitan Toronto Library.


Montreal Gazette, 7 July 1849.
Map of band hunting territories along the north shore of Lake Superior, Crown Lands Department, Surveyor’s Office, August 1849, AO, Irving Papers, MU 1464, 26/31/04.

Alexander Vidal, Memorandum of Indian Mission, 1849, Vidal Papers, CA 90N, VID 33, Regional Collections, University of Western Ontario, London. See also A Journal of Proceedings on My Mission to the Indians—Lake Superior and Huron, 1849, by Alexander Vidal, transcribed by George Smith, with historical notes by M. Elizabeth Arthur (Bright’s Cove, ON, 1974).

Report of Commissioners A. Vidal and Thomas G. Anderson on a visit to Indians on North Shore Lake Huron and Superior for purpose of investigating their claims to territory bordering on these Lakes, 1849, 7. With extracts from the notes taken at the conference with the Indians at the Sault Ste. Marie—15 and 16 October 1849, AO, Irving Papers, MU 1464 26/31/04.

William MacTavish, the Hudson’s Bay Company factor at the Sault, stated that the Mica Bay expedition had been in its planning stages for a long time, although there had been some dispute as to whether Michipicoten or Mica Bay would be the destination. William MacTavish to A. H. Campbell, 11 November 1849, Sault Ste. Marie Post, Correspondence Book, NAC, MG 20, B/194/b/15/1849–50.

According to the local Hudson’s Bay Company factor, the expedition included the Macdonell brothers, another lawyer named Wharton Metcalfe, three American Ojibwa (one of whom was the head chief Oshawano, also named Cassaquadung), five American Métis, twelve Canadian Ojibwa, thirteen Canadian Métis, and one French Canadian. William MacTavish to A. H. Campbell, 16 November 1849, Sault Ste. Marie Post, Correspondence Book, NAC, MG 20, B/194/b/15/1849–50.

Alexander Macdonell Estate Papers, Biographical Information. AO, MU 1778; NAC, Macdonell of Collochie Papers, MG 24 I 8, Finding Aid 99, Biographical Notes. Allan Macdonell to R. Bruce, 21 December 1849, NAC, RG 10, vol. 179, 109890.


British Colonist, Toronto, 8 February 1850.

William MacTavish to George Simpson, 17 October 1849, NAC, MG 20, B/194/b/15/1849–50.

Macdonell, who spoke the Ojibwa language, wrote of this relationship: “I have lived among the Indians some little time and am received among them as one of their own people. The chiefs of the different bands upon the Lake have reposed a trust and confidence in me which I deem worthy of attention.” Macdonell to Bruce, 23 December 1849, NAC, RG 10, vol. 179, 103884.

The Patriot, Toronto, 19 December 1849.

See, for example, the article in the Detroit Free Press, 22 December 1849.


Reserve boundaries delineated on a survey plan prepared in 1853 by J. S. Dennis do not conform to the description of the boundaries of the Garden River Reserve as set out in the Robinson Huron treaty of 1850. One explanation for the discrepancy is that the survey plan of 1853 releases the Clark
location from the burden of native title by isolating it beyond the reserve’s “revised” western boundary. Peterborough, ON, Ministry of Natural Resources, Survey Records, Plan 14, k19, 2484 by J. S. Dennis, 14 May 1853.

87 The Ojibwa promised to keep Philetus Church’s establishment “supplied with logs for sawing” for ten years, while the merchant would pay twenty-five pounds annually to Little Pine for the privilege of having the timber protected from exploitation by other commercial agencies. The Ojibwa would be paid for logs they wished to sell, and Church promised to saw a certain quota of the timber hauled to his mill for the band’s own use, free of charge. The local Anglican missionary felt the contract to be a good one, because Church had dealt honestly with the band for many years. Unfortunately, the merchant resided on Sugar Island, just offshore of the reserve, but on the American side of the border. Agreement between Shingwaukonse and his band and P. S. Church, July 1851, NAC, RG 10, vol. 191, 11383–84. After 1851 a young and energetic Methodist missionary, the Reverend George MacDougall, renewed the band’s interest in farming and assisted with the building of houses and barns in the community.

88 Allan Macdonell to George Brown, 20 April 1853, George Brown Papers, Correspondence, AO, MS 91, pkg. 11. The law was titled An Act to Make Better Provision for the Administration of Justice in the Unorganized Tracts of the Country in Upper Canada (16 Vict. Cap. 176).


90 William Warren provides a detailed genealogy for Amose, whose name is also spelled “Ahmous,” in History of the Ojibway Nation, 318. Ahmous was Kech-e-nuzhuyah’s great-great-grandson. Other alternate spellings include Amoos and Amous.

91 Petition of Ashkepogegosh of Leech Lake and twenty other American chiefs, 1853, NAC, RG 10, vol. 198, pt. 1, 116289.

92 A recent article traces the effects of this kind of humiliation on Loon’s Foot of Fond du Lac. See Kugel, “Religion Mixed with Politics.”


94 Shingwaukonse’s grave site lay on the west bank of the Garden River. Kohl, Kitchi-Gami, 373. It has since been destroyed by erosion, but the Anglican Church, which was located nearby, is sometimes regarded as a symbolic marker to his burial site.


96 William Van Abbott to Indian Affairs, 9 January 1891; included with notice of death of A. Shingwauk, NAC, RG 10, vol. 2552, file 112, 279.

97 Four gravel pits, the source of the high-grade stone used by Ontario in 1909 in the construction of the Sault Ste. Marie to Sudbury trunk road, were expropriated by the Canadian Pacific Railway under the Railway Act of 1879 despite a major protest movement launched against their alienation by the Garden River band between 1897 and 1913. Correspondence on the gravel pits, NAC, RG 10, vol. 2068, file 10, 307, pt. 2.

98 George Kabaosa was forced to step down as elected chief shortly after he had won office in March 1916; 4 March 1916, Sault Ste. Marie Agency Records,
Shingwaukonse

AO, MS 216 (5). His campaigns to gain prerogatives over timber on the reserve were taken up by Chief Amable Boissoneau in the 1930s.

99 The favoring of inclusiveness had proceeded so far that Eshkebugecooshe at Leech Lake had called for radical structural reforms in initiation rites. Schoolcraft, Historical and Statistical Information, 5:426–27.

100 Interview with ex-councillor Fred E. Pine Sr., 20 June 1984.


102 For instance, in the early decades of the twentieth century the Garden River First Nation won a victory when the government sanctioned an agreement between the Ojibwa and a local quarrying company that ensured employment for band members, provided insurance benefits, respected boundaries set down by the chief and council, and stated that when the site ceased to be worked, it would revert to the band. Ultimately, all sides benefited, and the Ojibwa showed themselves to be a responsible and just host group to outside entrepreneurial interests willing to negotiate and adhere respectfully to their terms. AO, Sault Ste. Marie Agency Records, 1924, Department of Indian Affairs, MS 216 (8). “Garden River Trap Rock Deposit to be Operated—$1,000,000 Plant Assured,” Sault Star, Sault Ste. Marie, ON, 23 November 1928.

103 The author is indebted to Mr. Pine for his willingness to share his knowledge about his great-grandfather, Shingwaukonse, as well as about Ojibwa leadership in general. This information is drawn from an interview with ex-councillor Fred Erskine Pine Sr., 5 January 1984.